How closely do banks manage vault cash? by Donald S. Allen
1 These data are for all depository
institutions.  Separating Federal
Reserve member banks intro-
duces breaks in the data.  We
can assume that the changes in
member bank reserve manage-
ment methods contributed to
the increase.  Other checkable
deposits that became signiﬁcant
during the 1980s are included
as part of demand deposits for
this period.








eginning in 1959, Federal Reserve
member banks were allowed to use
both vault cash and deposits at Federal
Reserve Banks to satisfy statutory reserve
requirements.  Prior to this time, member
banks were restricted to satisfying required
reserves solely with deposits at Federal
Reserve Banks.  Hence, member banks
held currency in their vaults only to satisfy
daily demands by depositors.  Fluctuations
in the levels of vault cash prior to 1959
therefore can be assumed to reﬂect changes
in depositors’ demands for cash, or changes
in the opportunity cost of vault cash (the
cost of holding versus the cost of running
out).  Figure 1 shows the historical move-
ment of vault cash as a percent of demand
deposits at depository institutions from
1930 to 1997.  During the 1930s, vault
cash as a percent of demand deposits
ranged between 4 and 5 percent, possibly
reﬂecting higher public demand for curren-
cy or more conservative management by
banks as a result of the banking crises of
the early 1930s and the Great Depression.
During the period from the mid-1940s to
the late 1950s, vault cash was typically
around 2.5 percent of demand deposits.
After 1959, decisions on how much
currency to hold in vaults became
inﬂuenced by total reserve management
decisions.  Banks could choose the amount
of their required reserves that they wanted
to be satisﬁed by currency in the vaults and
the amount they wanted to hold in their
accounts at the Fed.  The opportunity costs
were reduced for holding vault cash in
excess of that required for customer demand
but less than required for reserves.  Banks
could hold more currency than they needed
for customer transactions if this currency
also satisﬁed a portion of required reserves.
The result, as Figure 1 shows, was that
vault cash as a percent of total demand
deposits increased steadily from 1959.1
Depository institutions are currently
in an era of relatively low reserve require-
ments, yet bank vault cash holdings have
been increasing—both in magnitude and
as a percent of net transaction deposits.  
Donald S. Allen is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  Thomas A. Pollmann provided research assistance.
Varying Requirements for Nonmember Banks
The role of vault cash for nonmember banks and thrifts is more complex than that
for Federal Reserve member banks, as described in this article.  Prior to the Monetary
Control Act of 1980, these institutions were subject to a wide range of state-imposed
reserve requirements (see Gilbert and Lovati, 1978).  In some states, no requirements
were imposed and vault cash presumably was held solely to meet customer needs.  In
others, vault cash could be applied to satisfy required reserves.  This system changed
dramatically in November 1980, when all nonmember banks and thrifts that offer
transaction deposits became subject to the same reserve requirements as member
banks and could use vault cash to satisfy such requirements.  The requirements for
nonmember institutions were phased in over a seven-year period from 1980 to 1987.
During this period, the vault cash behavior of nonmember institutions likely was gov-
erned by a complicated mixture of customer needs and statutory reserve requirements.FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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2 An (S,s) inventory decision rule
establishes an upper limit, S,
and a lower limit, s, on inventory.
When stocks fall below s,
inventories are replenished to
the upper limit.
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In December 1990 and April 1992, reserve
requirements were reduced signiﬁcantly.
In addition, starting in 1995, banks began
“sweeping” customers’ cash reserves into
savings accounts that were not subject to
reserve requirements, further reducing the
amounts  designated as required reserves
(and reported net transaction deposits).
Because of this reduction, the percentage
of required reserves satisﬁed by vault cash
has increased steadily.  At the same time,
the number of “bound banks,” or banks
whose required reserves are not satisﬁed
completely by vault cash, has decreased.
As shown in Table 1, the number of
bound small banks in the Eighth Federal
Reserve District decreased from 27 percent
in 1993 to 20 percent in 1996; the number
of bound medium banks decreased from
74 percent in 1993 to 51 percent in 1996;
and the number of bound large banks
decreased from 100 percent in 1993 to 72
percent in 1996.  In addition, the amount
of total reserve requirements satisﬁed
entirely by vault cash increased from 54
percent in 1993 to 75 percent in 1996.
Figure 2 shows total required reserves
and the total vault cash held by banks in
the Eighth District.  The downward trend
in reserves over the last three years,
accompanied by an upward trend in vault
cash, is obvious.  By itself, the increase in
vault cash does not imply a surplus.  But,
as Figure 3 (taken from Anderson and
Rasche, 1996) shows, the quantity of “sur-
plus” vault cash (i.e., above that used to
meet reserve requirements) has increased
steadily.  This rise in surplus vault cash, in
conjunction with the increase in nonbound
banks, suggests that vault cash levels are
not managed very closely or are constrained
by precautionary balances to serve customer
needs, rather than statutory reserve
requirements.
This article looks at daily vault cash
holdings in the Eighth District (headquar-
tered in St. Louis) to determine whether
the observed amounts of vault cash held by
banks are consistent with the fundamental
assumptions of a one-sided (S,s) inventory
decision rule, a well-known model of
optimal ﬁrm inventory management.2
It also reviews how the limits implied by
the (S,s) model change as a function of 
the mean and variance of demand and the











1959  1967  1975  1983
1963  1971  1979  1995 1987
1991









1930 1936 1942 1948
1933 1939 1945 1957 1951
1954 1960
SOURCE: Friedman and Schwartz–A Monetary History of 
the United States, 1867-1960
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Data




















09 Jan 89  07 Jan 91  04 Jan 93  02 Jan 95
08 Jan 90  06 Jan 92  03 Jan 94  01 Jan 96
Total Required Reserves  





Phase-in of applied vault 












1959  1965  1971  1977  1983  1989  1995
1962  1968  1974  1980  1986  1992
Percent of Banks with Required Reserves
Satisfied by Vault Cash
Bank Size  1993  1994  1995  1996
Small  73  73  79  80
Medium  26  33  43  49
Large  0  5  19  28
Total Reserve Requirement
Satisﬁed by Vault Cash  54%  57%  62%  75%
Table 1
The rest of the paper is organized as
follows:  The ﬁrst section following the
overview looks at why banks hold vault
cash and what parameters affect how
much they hold.  The next section reviews
the vault cash data for the Eighth District
to determine how recent developments in
reserve requirements have affected vault
cash levels.  The following section provides
a review of the theoretical motivation for
(S,s) inventory behavior, and simulations
are performed to provide insight into
whether banks are managing vault cash
A Closer Look at the
Reserve Requirements  
Picture
As of 1992, the required reserve
margins established by the Federal
Reserve for depository institutions were
3 percent of net transaction deposits up
to $49.3 million and 10 percent on net
transaction deposits above $49.3 mil-
lion.  The rate on the second tranche
was reduced from 12 percent to 10 per-
cent in April 1992, and the size of the
ﬁrst tranche was reduced from $52.0
million to $49.3 million in January
1997.  Larger depository institutions
have either a weekly or biweekly
reserve account maintenance period,
beginning on a Thursday and ending on
a Wednesday, and reserve requirements
are on a contemporaneous basis.  The
typical reserve requirement therefore
depends on the size of the bank.  The
reserve requirement in the Eighth Dis-
trict averages to about 8 percent of
transaction deposits, with smaller
banks averaging around 3 percent and
larger banks averaging more than 8 per-
cent.  Reserves are held as vault cash or
deposits at the Federal Reserve Bank.
Deposits at the Federal Reserve that are
not used to satisfy reserve requirements
may be used to satisfy clearing balances
and are available for overnight loans to
other institutions.FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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conservatively.  The ﬁnal section offers
some tentative conclusions.
WHY DO BANKS HOLD
VAULT CASH?
Banks maintain an inventory of
currency in vaults primarily to meet the
daily currency demands of depositors, either
at the teller window or in automated teller
machines (ATMs).  If banks knew with 
certainty the daily ﬂows of currency from
deposits and withdrawals, the amount of
vault cash required could be determined
precisely.  In addition, if there were no costs
associated with the shipment of currency,
banks could reduce their holdings of vault
currency and increase the frequency of cur-
rency shipments.  However, the relative
randomness of currency ﬂows and the ﬁxed
cost of obtaining currency shipments induce
banks to hold higher levels of vault cash. A
bank’s incentive to minimize vault cash
holdings is reduced further when such cash
also counts as part of required reserves.
Uncertainty in the daily ﬂow of
currency dictates that banks hold some
average level of vault currency to cover the
probability of “stocking out” of cash.  The
ﬁxed costs associated with currency ship-
ments make it cost effective to achieve 
this average vault cash level by infrequent
shipments of larger amounts of currency.
Thus, banks identify some trigger level
below which vault cash will be replenished
and either a maximum level to which vault
cash will be replenished or an economic
batch amount, which is considered an
optimum shipment amount.  This situation
leads to a decision rule referred to in the
inventory management literature as (S,s)
behavior, where S is the upper limit of
vault cash, and s is the lower limit or
replenishment signal.  Both the upper and
lower limits will depend on the intraday
proﬁle of withdrawals and deposits, as well
as the cost associated with shipments and
the opportunity costs of stocking out.
The intraday demand proﬁle is a func-
tion of the types of customers the bank
serves.  For example, a bank that primarily
serves retail ﬁrms may see a net daily
inﬂow of currency, whereas a bank that
primarily serves individual customers may
receive the bulk of its deposits in the form
of checks and thus experience a net outﬂow
of currency.  If the bank experiences a net
inﬂow of currency, which may be the case
if its customers are primarily commercial
enterprises, the bank may identify an
upper limit of vault cash that will induce it
to send currency back to the Fed to credit
to its account.  If a bank experiences a net
currency withdrawal each day, then a large
shipment may be received each time the
level falls below the trigger, boosting the
level of vault cash.  This level is drawn
down over a period of time (days) until
the lower level is reached and another
shipment is received, again boosting vault
cash levels.  Both types will lead to a saw-
tooth pattern of vault cash levels.  In one
case, vault cash will rise slowly and fall
quickly; in the other, vault cash will rise
quickly and fall gradually.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 show this typical
pattern for a small, medium, and large
bank in the Eighth District over a period
in 1992.  The small bank’s vault cash rises
on Mondays, possibly from shipments of
currency from the Fed or from an inﬂux of
commercial deposits from weekend sales.
The end-of-day vault balance tends to fall
during the week, with Fridays showing the
biggest decrease.  The medium bank also
has an increase in vault currency on Mon-
days, but on average there are net increases
during the week and again a net drop on
Fridays.  The large bank shows an increase
on Mondays, with a large drop on Fridays.
The similar patterns on Fridays may reﬂect
payroll withdrawals.
As we have said, vault cash also counts
toward reserve requirements.  The Federal
Reserve does not pay interest on required
reserves, but banks are able to earn credits
against other services on a portion of the
deposits at Federal Reserve Banks.  If a
bank has a clearing balance contract, there
is also an incentive to maintain surplus
reserves in accounts at the Fed to reduce
potential overdrafts.  In addition, lagged
vault cash is used to satisfy reserve
requirements, so that lower vault cash inFEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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the current period can be used to hedge
against unexpected changes in Fed
account balances.  So there is some trade-
off between reserves held at the Fed or
vault cash.  But when banks are bound,
there is room for more conservative vault
cash management than would otherwise
occur.  This seems to be the case in the
Eighth District.
BANK VAULT CASH 
BALANCES
The end-of-day vault cash balances at
all banks in the Eighth District from 1989
to 1996 were analyzed to determine the
average minimum levels and replenishment
points targeted by the banks.  Figure 7
shows the average number of days
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3 The term “net transaction
deposits” refers to those
deposits subject to statutory
reserve requirements.
4 The vault cash ﬁgures shown
here are average end-of-day ﬁg-
ures. They do not give a good
view of the ﬂuctuations during
the day.  For example, large
deposits from commercial cus-
tomers in the evening may
mask the actual minimum level
that has occurred.
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small, medium, and large banks in the
Eighth District.  As the ﬁgure shows, the
typical number of days between replenish-
ment remains relatively constant, at
approximately three.  Small banks show a
decline in the days between replenishment
since the start of the period, suggesting a
possible decrease in the relative ﬁxed cost
of shipments.
Replenishment every three days would
indicate a relatively volatile movement in
vault cash balances (as with [S,s] inventory
management).  This volatility is lowered in
the aggregate because of offsetting patterns
at different banks.  Table 2 shows the
mean vault cash level as a percentage of
net transaction deposits and the variance
of these levels for individual banks and for
the aggregate of all banks.3 As expected,
the volatility of total vault cash balances as
a percentage of net transaction deposits is
signiﬁcantly less than for the average bank.
So, whereas the frequent trips for currency
lead to high volatility for individual banks,
negative correlation among banks smooths
out the volatility in the aggregate.  This
pattern suggests that interbank currency
transfers can reduce the role of the Federal
Reserve in providing currency.
Figures 8, 9, and 10 show the average
upper and lower levels of vault cash as a
percentage of net transaction deposits
(NTD) over the period from 1989 to 1997.
Observing the upper and lower bounds of
the average vault cash balances, one can
conclude that larger banks appear to have
an average minimum balance of 4.4 percent
of NTD and an average maximum of
around 5.1 percent of NTD.  A decline in
1997 followed a noticeable rise in the two
prior years.  Medium banks, on average,
hold peak vault cash balances of around
4.5 percent of NTD and have minimum
triggers of around 3.7 percent.  Small banks
fall in the lower 3 percent tranche of reserve
requirements but appear to be slightly
more conservative than medium banks,
holding vault cash balances between 4.0
percent and 4.9 percent of NTD. This differ-
ence would suggest that most small banks
are nonbound most of the time.  These
vault cash band widths conﬁrm the aggre-
gate results of Table 1.  The increase in the
ratio of vault currency as a percentage  of
NTD in large banks may also reﬂect the
reduction in NTD due to sweeps, rather
than an increase in the levels of vault cash
being stored.  Whether the accounts that
have been moved to sweeps should be still
considered transaction deposits in deciding
the amount of vault cash needed is a sepa-
rate issue.
To evaluate whether these levels are
conservative, we need to know the distrib-
ution of intraday demands for withdrawals
and deposits, the transaction costs of new
shipments of currency, and the penalty that
the cash manager assigns to stocking out













Mean Days Between Vault Cash  
Replenishment
1989 Q1  1991 Q1  1993 Q1  1995 Q1  1997 Q1
Mean Ratio of Vault Cash to Net  
Transaction Deposits
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Individual Banks
Mean  4.98  4.84  4.51  4.17  3.92  4.02  4.38  4.90  4.94*
Variance 2.35  2.79  1.03  1.26  0.64  1.31  1.42  1.74  1.23*
Aggregate
Mean  4.68  4.72  4.51  4.02  3.84  4.03  4.50  5.44  6.22*
Variance  0.12  0.13  0.11  0.10  0.07  0.10  0.11  0.24  0.44*
*1997 ﬁgures exclude small banks in the third and fourth quarters.  During the last two
quarters of 1997, it appears that small banks increased reclassiﬁcations, thereby lowering
net transaction deposits signiﬁcantly.
Table 2FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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formalized by Scarf (1960).5 One way of
testing the optimality of the observed levels
of vault cash holding is to choose parame-
ters for Scarf’s model that suggest a band
width (upper and lower limits) equivalent
to the observed vault cash limits.  The next
section reviews the theoretical derivation
of the (S,s) parameters and suggests choices
of parameters to test whether banks are




The optimization of vault cash must
trade off the cost of “stocking out” of cash
against the opportunity cost of trading in
the overnight markets relative to bank cash
managers’ level of risk aversion.  The
problem belongs to the class of inventory
decisions.  More speciﬁcally, if there are
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ﬁxed costs associated with obtaining
currency from the Fed (for example, trans-
portation costs), and there are zero marginal
costs of purchasing currency, an (S,s) inven-
tory rule for vault cash management may be
optimal.  That is, banks may establish a min-
imum vault cash level, s, below which they
will replenish, and a target level, S, to which
they will raise vault cash.  When vault cash
lies between these two levels, no action is
taken.  Although these target levels will vary
with the probability distribution of customer
transactions and the opportunity cost of
holding cash, changes in these levels may be
sticky.  This inherent nonlinearity of (S,s)
management can lead to difﬁculty in identi-
fying interest elasticities.
The optimality of (S,s) inventory
behavior hinges on the existence of
nontrivial ﬁxed adjustment costs associated
with purchases (or production).  In the
one-period case, assuming rt is the cost of
storage and pt is the price of the product,
we can determine the penalty cost of
stocking out and the cost of having
inventory I*
t at the beginning of period t,
assuming that orders are ﬁlled instanta-
neously.  We assume that the ﬁrm observes
the inventory level at the end of the previous
period and then decides the level of inven-
tory to hold for this period.  Put another
way, the ﬁrm makes a decision on the
appropriate level of inventory for period t,
given the level of inventory at the end of
the previous period, the expected cost of
storage, and the expected cost of stocking
out.  See the shaded insert for a formal
derivation of the limits (S,s), which
appears on page 51.
The determinants of the band width
(S,s) for inventory are (1) the distribution
of demand (represented by the mean, m,
and the standard deviation, s), (2) the price
of the product, p, (3) the cost of storage, r,
and (4) the “shape” of the cost curve (or,
more directly, the shape of the marginal cost
curve).  The interval can be expressed as a
function, h(.), of these parameters:
where a0, a1, and a2 are the constant term
(ﬁxed cost), the coefﬁcient on the linear
term, and the coefﬁcient on the quadratic
term of the cost equation, respectively.
Note that h(.) is a highly nonlinear and
discontinuous function.  The important
parameters are the relative markup between
price and marginal cost (which determines
the beneﬁt of adjusting) and the probability
distribution of demand (which determines
the relative cost of storage).
Because the (S,s) model is nonlinear, it
is difﬁcult to measure the effects of changes
in parameters on the desired level of stock
by observing contemporaneous changes.
In other words, a change in (S,s) may or
may not result in a contemporaneous
change in inventory level, depending on
the initial location of the ﬁrm’s inventories
within the band.  For instance, if S were to
rise as a result of a decrease in interest
rates but there were sufﬁcient inventory to
delay replenishment, no concurrent move
would be observed in inventory levels; in
fact, inventory would fall.  If ﬁrms needed
to replenish at the same time that the
desired upper bound increased, inventories
would rise above normal.  Interest rate
elasticities computed under the two
different initial conditions would be
underestimated in one instance and 
overestimated in the other.
The upper bound, S, increases with
(1) an increase in mean demand, (2) an
increase in the variance of demand, (3) a
decrease in the cost of storage (r), or (4)
an increase in the markup over marginal
cost (p-a1).
Similarly, the lower bound, s,
decreases with (1) an increase in the
“quasi-ﬁxed” cost (a0), (2) an increase in
the cost of storage (r), (3) an increase in
the marginal cost, (4) a decrease in the
price (p), (5) a decrease in the mean
demand, or (6) an increase in the variance
of demand.
Adaptation to Vault Currency
To apply the Scarf inventory model to
vault currency management, we need to
make some modiﬁcations.6 In particular,
the “cost” associated with obtaining
currency is limited to the “quasi-ﬁxed”
[S,s]= h( , ,p,r,a ,a ,a ) 0 1 2 m s ,
JULY/AUGUST 1998
6Poole (1968) applies a similar
inventory model to reserve
management.  Here, the focus
is primarily on currency held 
in vaults, rather than total
reserve management.  Orr and
Mellon (1961) also used this
method to analyze expansion
of bank credit.FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
51
JULY/AUGUST  1998
costs (transportation and administrative)
associated with each trip to the Federal
Reserve Bank, correspondent bank, or
other source of currency shipments.7 The
“cost” of stocking out of currency is not
simply the lost revenue from a transaction,
it also involves lost customer conﬁdence
and future implications.  This variable may
be as much subjective as it is real.  Since
cash ﬂow will be in both directions 
(in contrast to the monotonic decrease of
inventory), the distribution of demand for
7 The Fed has instituted limits 
on the number of free currency
shipments allowed by member
banks.  This limit would need
to be factored into the assumed
cost of currency. 
Derivation of the (S,s) Inventory Rule
If demand is a random variable with known probability distribution g(D), and we
have an initial inventory level of  It-1 at the end of period t-1, then we can formulate the
sum of the expected penalty and holding cost of purchasing sufﬁcient quantity to have
an inventory level of I*
t at the beginning of period t  as L(I*
t )
(1)
The ﬁrst term represents the expected lost revenue from stocking out, when
demand exceeds inventories; it is a decreasing function of the inventory level.  The sec-
ond term reﬂects the cost of storage, or the unit storage cost times the expected excess
of inventory over demand; it is an increasing function of inventory level. L(I*
t ) is U-
shaped or V-shaped, reﬂecting the sum of the downward-sloping expected cost of
stocking out and the upward-sloping cost of holding inventory.
Assuming linear costs of ordering,1 if we order Qt= I*
t – It–1, then the total costs (of
ordering, stockout, and inventory) can be expressed as follows: 
(2)
Scarf (1960) shows that if we deﬁne S as the value of I*
t that minimizes a1I*
t + L(I*
t )
and s as the value I*
t that makes
(3)
then it can be shown that the optimal policy is
(4)
We can further determine S from the following result:
(5)
where G(S) is the cumulative distribution of the demand.  Using the deﬁnition in Equa-
tion 3, we can then obtain the value of s.
1 i.e., f(Qt) = a0 + a1 Qt
G(S)=
p  - a
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vault cash is the joint distribution of
demand for withdrawals of currency and
the supply of currency deposits.
As an upper bound, we can assume
that the cost of stocking out exceeds the
storage cost by a factor of 10.  From Equa-
tion 5 it can be shown that the maximum
(threshold) of vault cash, S, is determined
by the value that equates G(S) to p/p+r.
Thus if p  is 10 times r, this fraction
becomes 10/10+1, which is around 0.91.
This result suggests that the maximum
level of vault cash should be about two
standard deviations above the average
daily demand for currency.  The lower
limit, or trigger point, is a function of the
quasi-ﬁxed transaction cost—in this case,
primarily transportation costs.  If the
penalty portion of the cost curve (i.e., the
expected cost of running out of cash) is
steep, then the minimum will be close to
the maximum.  In this situation, we would
expect banks to frequently replenish vault
cash to their maximum levels.
As a lower bound, if we assume that
the cost of stocking out is equal to the cost
of storage (foregone interest), then the
penalty function is symmetric and G(S) =
r/(r+r), or 0.5. This result suggests that the
maximum vault cash level would be the
mean daily demand for vault cash.  Again,
the minimum level  s would depend on the
“quasi-ﬁxed” cost, or transportation cost,
in such a way that replenishment takes
place when the expected cost of a shortfall
exceeds the quasi-ﬁxed cost.  A choice of
S as the mean daily cash demand would
most likely result in at least a daily replen-
ishment of vault cash.  If the ﬁxed
(transportation) cost were small enough,
the trigger would be relatively close to the
maximum and would imply replenishment
more than once throughout the day.
The penalty for running out of vault
cash is difﬁcult to deﬁne.  If a bank can
defer demand for large amounts of cash, then
outliers can be eliminated from the assumed
distribution of demand.  Similarly, if cash
can be obtained from the Federal Reserve or
other banks on relatively  short notice, then
a smaller upper bound (S) and a narrow
band width can be accommodated easily.
Calibrated Cases
The key to determining whether banks
are conservatively managing vault cash is
by knowing the probability distribution  of
the intraday deposits and withdrawals.  A
good model of the costs associated with
stocking out is also required.  Unfortunately,
we have neither of these.  The model above
can be calibrated with speciﬁc choices for
the coefﬁcients to give the average lower
and upper bounds, shown in ﬁgures 8-10.
Table 3 shows nine cases with assumed
parameter values for Equation 6 and the
resulting upper and lower bounds.  For
Case 1, the parameters are chosen to give
upper and lower limits equivalent to the
1993 second-quarter averages for the upper
and lower limits for small banks, shown in
Figure 8.  These parameters are consistent
with the observed average of three days
between replenishment.  The mean demand
was chosen to produce replenishment
every three days when the separation of  S
and  s is 0.81 percent of NTD.  The cost of
maintaining vault balances was assumed to
be approximately the overnight  rate of bor-
rowing.  The penalty cost, p, and standard
deviation, s, were chosen to ﬁx the upper
limit at 4.31 percent of NTD, and the ﬁxed
cost, a0, was chosen to ﬁx the lower limit
at 3.48.  The standard deviation chosen is
large, compared with the mean value of
demand, and suggests a great deal of
Sample Parameters for Equation 6
Case  Mean (m)  S.D.(s)  p  r  a0 a1 S  s
1  0.27  3  0.1  0.02  0.0025  0  4.31  3.48
2  0.27  3  0.05  0.02  0.0025  0  3.34  2.43
3  0.27  3  0.05  0.02  0.002  0  3.34  2.52
4  0.27  3  0.02  0.02  0.002  0  2.13  1.20
5  1.0  3  0.02  0.02  0.002  0  2.44  1.54
6  0.3  5  0.10  0.02  0.0025  0  7.09  6.00
7  0.3  2  10  0.02  0.0025  0  6.41  5.96
8  0.3  2  5  0.02  0.0025  0  5.99  5.51
9  0.3  2  1  0.02  0.0025  0  4.88  4.36
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uncertainty in the withdrawal/ deposit
rates.  By way of comparison, Table 2
shows a standard deviation of 1.67 of the
mean vault cash holdings of all Eighth Dis-
trict banks in 1990.  This is obviously not
the same as the standard deviation of daily
demand, but it represents the ﬂuctuation
around mean vault cash levels for all banks.
Cases 2 through 6 show the changes to
the (S,s) interval as the other parameters
are changed.  Case 2 shows the effect of
reducing the penalty cost of running out of
currency by one-half, from ﬁve times the
opportunity cost of holding extra vault
cash.  The upper bound, S, falls by 1
percent of NTD to 3.34 percent of NTD.
In Case 3, the ﬁxed cost associated with
currency shipments is lowered, making
more frequent trips economical.  This
raises the trigger point, s, for replenishment.
Case 4 shows the impact of assuming sym-
metric costs of storage and stocking out.
This situation reduces the upper and lower
bounds.  Increasing the mean demand, as
in Case 5, raises the upper and lower
bounds.  Case 6 shows that raising the
standard deviation of demand from three
to ﬁve, compared with Case 1, increases
the band width to the level shown for large
banks in Figure 10.  Case 7 shows the
minimum and maximum vault cash levels
that would occur if a “more reasonable”
standard deviation of demand were used,
but a very high penalty factor—equivalent
to 500 times the cost of storage—were
applied to running short of cash.  In this
case, the minimum and maximum are in
the same order as those recorded in Figure
10.  Cases 8 and 9 show the reductions in
minimum and maximum vault cash levels
that would occur if the penalty assigned to
running out were lowered to 250 times
and 50 times the storage rate, respectively.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The data through 1997 appear to sup-
port the idea that banks have not been
managing vault cash holdings very closely.
Within the context of an (S,s) inventory
model, the variance of net withdrawals
and/or the penalty associated with running
out would have to be very high to justify
the levels of vault cash balances.  When
banks are bound, there is less incentive 
to optimize currency holdings.  Because
the reserve requirement levels have fallen
as a result of the rate reduction and the
implementation of “sweeps,” nonbound
banks have had more incentive to reduce
surplus vault cash.  Some banks have begun
to use consultants to implement vault cash
management strategies.  As this practice
becomes more prevalent, currency operations
at Federal Reserve Banks could see a tem-
porary net inﬂow of currency and possibly
more frequent shipments.  There may also
be an increase in the noise in the measure-
ment of monetary aggregates and a rise in
the elasticity of bank reserves to interest rate
changes.  The implications for safety and
soundness of depository institutions are
not immediately clear, but are not expected
to be large.  It would appear that if banks
maintain less buffer stock holdings of currency,
then they may be more sensitive to increased
demand for currency.  However, innovations
in the payments system are likely to reduce
the demand for currency in the future.
In summary, the degree to which banks
optimize their vault currency holdings has
implications for the Fed’s currency manage-
ment, monetary policy effectiveness,  and
the safety and soundness of ﬁnancial insti-
tutions.  For these reasons, vault currency
management should be monitored.  Initial
indications are that depository institutions
have begun to pay closer attention to vault
cash needs; the impact of this new aware-
ness may be minimal but should be
assessed, nonetheless.
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